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Chapter 8
Analysis of the Administrative Capacity
of the Institutions in Charge of Overseeing
the Operations of Business Entities
Mihail Arandarenko
8.1 Introduction
According to the results of the survey, the respondents’ negative views of
inspection bodies were caused predominantly by corruption (32 %), inconsistency
in implementing regulations (20 %), strictness in implementing regulations (12 %)
and lack of regulation implementation (9 %). Nearly one-half of all respondents
(46 %) felt that bribery of inspectors was common or very common; 30 % believed
it took place sporadically, and only 6 % believed it never happened. The lack of a
consistent, predictable relationship with taxpayers is a common feature of these
findings.
About two-thirds of all business entities visited by oversight bodies stated that
visits had happened only once, while about another one-fifth stated that they had
received two visits. Visits generally took one day (in about 70 % of all cases).
Figure 8.1 shows the frequency of inspection visits tasked with oversight of
corporate operations by sector of activity. Half or less of all respondents stated that
they had been visited by these inspectors: 53 % cited Labour Inspection, 43 %
mentioned Market Inspection, while 38 cited the Tax Authority. Audits by govern-
ment bodies were much more rare for business entities in sectors most affected by
the shadow economy such as construction, agriculture, and transportation. The only
exception to this rule was catering, where inspection audits were more frequent than
the average.
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8.2 Tax Administration
According to 2011 data the Republic of Serbia Tax Administration employed 6,165
staff, which is less than optimal given the number of taxpayers and international
standards. This problem is compounded by the inadequate structure of current staff
by age, education, and organisation. Thus, of the total number, only 55 % have
university degrees and the average age of employees is 49. In addition, many staff
are tasked with receiving and technically processing tax filings, while the number of
people effectively carrying out tax audits is lower than necessary.
The relatively low degree of efficiency in uncovering tax evasion is the conse-
quence of the lack of human and financial resources available to the Tax Admin-
istration, the inadequate structure of Tax Administration staff, the lack of systemic
exchange of information with other government bodies that could be used to
discover tax evasion, etc. The total budget of the Tax Administration is lower
than is required; as a result, employee salaries are rather low, which incentivises
younger staff to leave after gaining experience in tax audits, which in turn has an
adverse impact on the quality of audits and the overall efficiency of the Tax
Administration. In addition, rigid public sector remuneration rules mean that the
Tax Administration is unable to adequately pay professionals that are most in
demand (e.g., IT experts or auditors). Many of its current employees are not
sufficiently trained to do their jobs as those jobs are defined at present.
Lack of automation of business processes, lack of an organised cross-checking
system to compare data from other government bodies (e.g., Real Estate Cadastre,
Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, local Public Revenue Administrations, the
police, etc.), and sub-optimal mechanisms used to select taxpayers for audit,
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Fig. 8.1 Frequency of audit by sector of activity. Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions
for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
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likelihood of uncovering tax evasion, which has served as an incentive for operating
in the informal sector. The current IT platform used by the Tax Administration does
not satisfy the needs of a modern public revenue authority. It needs replacing, and
transitional solutions must be found in the meantime. Too many tax administration
processes, including debt collection, rely on manual intervention. This substantially
decreases the efficiency of the Tax Administration. There is a major gap between
hardware and software: although multiple independent applications have been
developed to solve various issues they do not function as a whole, with some
posing their own problems. There are no business analysts in the Tax Administra-
tion who can appropriately define its business needs. An entire new system is
necessary, which requires a great deal of financial resources and time.
Changes to the Law on Tax Procedure and Tax Administration have meant that
the Tax Administration has become responsible for auditing entities engaged in
unregistered activity. Placing these powers within the remit of the Tax Adminis-
tration is justified, but, to achieve an appropriate level of efficiency, this broadening
of authority should be accompanied by major reforms to how the Tax Administra-
tion operates. Given the current number of tax inspectors (some 600 covering all of
Serbia), any new powers can be exercised only formally, since capacities to do so
are constrained. To resolve this issue the structure of Tax Administration staff must
be substantially changed: the number of employees tasked with administrative work
(receipt, certification, and registration of tax returns) should be reduced and the staff
effectively engaged in oversight increased. A switch to mandatory e-filing of tax
returns would reduce the need for the several hundred Tax Administration staff
estimated to be employed in administrative jobs, which would in turn enable part of
them (particularly the younger, better-educated staff) to be shifted to oversight tasks
after undergoing intensive training. Since many of these employees will neverthe-
less prove to be under-qualified for oversight tasks, the option of hiring well-
educated employees to deal exclusively with oversight should be considered.
Continuing improvements to the Tax Administration’s remuneration system is a
necessary precondition for retaining staff that already have the appropriate skills
and knowledge of tax audit procedures and for attracting young high-quality
employees.
Statutory, Institutional, and Organisational Framework The current framework
imposed by tax legislation poses numerous obstacles to efficient revenue adminis-
tration. The Tax Administration has no influence on how penalties are defined in
statute, nor can it get involved with actual sanctions practice, as this is the domain
of the courts. In addition, the threshold amount for tax fraud is much lower than in
most other countries, which shifts the focus away from major tax offenders and
means that tackling larger forms of evasion is less efficient.
The Tax Administration is formally a division of the Ministry of Finance, but
communication between the two does not flow both ways. The Tax Administration
is not sufficiently involved in providing support to the Ministry in its efforts to
design taxation policy, which is partly due to the weakness of the Tax Administra-
tion. Interpreting legislation and decision-making are currently within the remit of
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the Ministry of Finance rather than the Tax Administration, while in international
practice the reverse is often true. The current system in Serbia leads to substantial
delays in advice on the treatment of taxpayers, even by the Tax Administration,
which increases uncertainty among taxpayers.
The current organisational structure of the Serbian Tax Administration does not
reflect current organisational approaches in modern public revenue administration.
A strong central core is needed to design business processes, oversee their imple-
mentation, set operational goals, and oversee their realisation. At present the High
Taxpayer Unit does not have sufficient resources at its disposal to manage its client
base. The Education and Communication Division is in charge of training, rather
than the Human Resources Division, which would be more appropriate. Human
resources are under-utilised. For instance, more staff than necessary deal with desk
review and processing of tax filings while other more important tasks are neglected.
The number of branch offices is too large for an organisation the size of the Serbian
Tax Authority.
Since findings of empirical research (Alm et al. 1992) show that an increase in
the likelihood of tax evasion detection is a more efficient deterrent than other
mechanisms (such as reducing the tax burden or increasing penalties), there is
much room for tackling the shadow economy in Serbia by improving the efficiency
of the Tax Administration.
The Tax Administration should strive to ensure that its activities are aimed at
areas most at risk, that taxpayers who wish to comply with the law are able to do so
quickly and easily, and that enforcement is directed at repeated non-compliers. To
improve compliance the Tax Administration should particularly improve the vali-
dation of taxpayers and maintenance of taxpayer records by developing strategies
and programmes for a taxpayer service and increasing the standards of services
provided. In order to maintain compliance levels a greater focus on self-assessment
is needed and an overhaul of basic business procedures: development of a collection
strategy and a filing strategy (with various requirements for different types of filing,
and an emphasis on electronic filing and the removal of unnecessary forms);
improvement of oversight and collection of mandatory social security contributions
and payroll taxes; review of rules on handling requests for refunds/exemptions;
improvement of tax accounting; and review of penalties and their administration.
The relatively low efficiency of the Serbian Tax Administration in collecting
taxes has been borne out by the views of taxpayers voiced in the Survey on
Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, where equal portion of respondents
(46 % each) believed that the Tax Administration was either mainly unsuccessful




Tackling informal employment (colloquially known as ‘working in the shadow’) is
the primary task of the Labour Inspectorate, a separate division of the Ministry of
Labour, Employment, and Social Policy. The Labour Inspectorate is also charged
with carrying out other activities related to the implementation of the Labour Law,
the Health and Safety Law, and other labour legislation. The strategic aims of the
Labour Inspectorate are to minimise risks employees face at work, tackle
undeclared work, and combat breaches of rights arising from employment or
collective agreements. The Inspectorate is entitled to audit registered companies:
where it detects breaches of law—including work without a written employment
contract—it can require any deficiencies to be eliminated within a short period of
time. The Inspectorate employs some 260 inspectors, mainly lawyers, with a
number of engineers specialising in various fields, and operates in each of the
25 administrative districts and in Belgrade.
Labour inspectors are authorised to inspect a business’s internal bylaws and
individual contracts, as well as any and all other documents. They may take
statements from corporate officers and other interested parties, and may also inspect
offices, production plants, and other premises. The inspectors are also entitled to
launch audits based on reports made by members of the public, workers, or any
other interested parties. An integrated inspection oversight concept has been in
place in Serbia since early 2010, meaning that all labour inspectors undertake
comprehensive inspection actions: employment issues are not kept separate from
those related to health and safety.
A priority task of the Inspectorate has always been to verify whether workers
have formal employment contracts. People in informal employment are not
protected by workers’ rights, face greater risk of injury, are not entitled to
healthcare, and are denied unemployment benefits and old age pensions due to
the fact they are not registered for mandatory social security when in work. From
the point of view of safeguarding public interest, non-declaration of employees
entails tax evasion and a number of safety hazards, as well as other issues. Due to all
of the above, labour inspectors’ main task is to oversee the implementation of
statutory provisions governing “entering into labour relations”: i.e., uncovering
informally employed workers and formalising their status.
When workers without employment contracts are discovered at a business the
employer is given a deadline for either signing contracts with those employees or
letting them go. The employer must notify the Inspectorate of the steps taken within
8 days; inspectors will then visit the employer again to verify that the issue has been
resolved. Although this procedure is clearly aimed at protecting workers without
contracts its preventive role can be disputed, since there is no credible threat of
sanctions to prevent future non-compliance (Arandarenko 2012).
The effective power of labour inspectors is further constrained by two factors.
Firstly, although the law stipulates harsh fines, only courts can impose them. To
impose mass penalties in order to discourage the widespread non-compliance the
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Labour Inspectorate would have to become involved in a large number of individual
court cases, which is unrealistic as the procedure for proving allegations of this type
is demanding.
In performing oversight, labour inspectors establish whether people found on the
premises of a business entity have employment contracts. Inspectors can base their
official accounts of inspection visits on workers’ statements and conclude those
workers are employed informally (i.e., without a written employment contract, or
not declared for social insurance purposes), but employers can circumvent sanc-
tions by subsequently presenting employment contracts antedated to seem as if they
were entered into a day or two previous to the audit, and claim that the workers will
be declared for social insurance purposes by the statutory deadline—which, as a
rule, does take place.
In cases where an audit establishes that an employer is not paying taxes,
mandatory pension and disability insurance contributions, healthcare contributions,
and unemployment insurance contributions (payable for every month by the 30th
day of the next month, as required under Article 51 of the Law on Contributions for
Mandatory Social Insurance), labour inspectors cannot act independently but have
to report to the Tax Administration, the body in charge of implementing this
particular law. This procedure illustrates the shortcomings of the current
fragmented inspection system compared to the integrated inspection approach
used by most European countries.
Secondly, wholly unregistered ‘phantom firms’, typically located in private
homes and with all workers employed informally, are allowed by law to deny
labour inspectors access to their premises, since the Labour Inspectorate does not
have jurisdiction over them (unlike Market and Tourism Inspectorates). Audits
have detected many cases where employers have organised production in base-
ments, garages, and private homes, even though this is not easy to detect. The
buildings are unmarked and entrances are guarded by dogs and secured by cameras
and intercoms. Inspectors have found that these premises are most often venues for
sewing, shoemaking, carpentry, or other small-scale production, and the workers
are employed informally. Services, such as hairdressers or beauty parlours, may
also operate in this way. In these cases inspectors are expected to call in the police,
who generally lack enthusiasm for assisting since breaches of the Labour Law are,
from their perspective, relatively minor offences. Thus the worst infringements of
labour legislation remain almost completely beyond the reach of statutory sanction.
Articles 273 and 274 of the Labour Law envisage fines of RSD 1 million (about
€9,000 at the current exchange rate) for businesses employing workers without
appropriate contracts, not paying social security contributions, not paying wages,
paying wages below the statutory minimum, or paying wages partly ‘cash in hand’.
Fines for entrepreneurs are also high and amount to half the amount applicable to
businesses. Yet, in order for these fines actually to be imposed, inspectors must
bring and argue each case in court, which happens only rarely—until recently, in
only some 2 % of all cases. Of late there has been an increased number of
employment contracts entered into and workers registered for social insurance
after inspection visits. In addition to a stricter penal policy the way inspectors
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operate has changed, with visits now also being made outside of regular working
hours.
Misdemeanour judges often claim that the amounts of fines for infringement of
labour laws and health and safety regulations are unrealistic, given the current state
of the Serbian economy, which is why they have trouble handing down fines.
Nonetheless, penal policy applied by misdemeanour courts has become much
stricter over the past several years, with judges now, as a rule, handing down
fines that lie within the statutory range, rather than below the statutory minimum.
The Labour Inspectorate has contributed to this trend: inspectors have been appeal-
ing judgments that only impose reprimands instead of fines or hand down fines
below the statutory minimum; they have also been contesting rulings suspending
proceedings for lack of evidence. In addition, court cases are still liable to lapse due
to statutes of limitation. Labour inspectors have also been complaining that they
must testify in nearly every misdemeanour proceeding and face defendants on
multiple occasions, which is a large burden on their time.
Labour inspectors generally find that employers justify informal employment by
citing ‘trial employment periods’, claiming they need to assess the performance of
prospective employees before entering into employment contracts and registering
workers for social insurance. They also attempt to justify shadow employment by
claiming employees are reluctant to enter into formal contracts and wish to receive
higher wages resulting from employers not paying taxes.
Inspectors also cite instances where informally employed workers refuse to enter
into formal employment after inspectors intervene, instead leaving the employer in
order to be able to retain other statutory rights or benefits. This particularly
important consideration points to an often-overlooked cause of informal employ-
ment: the interests of the workers themselves, who might, when formally employed,
lose the right to social benefits, child support, unemployment benefits, or other
payments that are either de jure or de facto conditioned by the lack of any registered
income.
The Labour Inspectorate (Annual Report 2011) has found that informal employ-
ment is most common in trade, construction, industry, tourism and catering, crafts
and home repair, and personal services. Some activities record an increase in
informal workers over the same periods of each year, which is a particular hallmark
of catering and construction. Catering sees this trend in the summer, while in
construction it is evident towards the end of the building season as employers strive
to meet deadlines. However, enhanced inspection oversight is employed in the
construction sector throughout the year due to the possible health and safety risk.
Shadow employment in the construction sector is fostered by high employee
turnover, frequent shifts from one construction site to another, and brief periods
of employment, as workers remain on site only until a particular job is finished.
Inspectors have also discovered that unregistered employers in the shadow
economy mainly hire young unskilled labourers, with at most secondary school
diplomas; they also employ workers without permanent incomes, the unemployed
over 40 years of age, beneficiaries of various types of assistance or social security,
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etc. In most cases there is agreement between these employees and their employers
and no direct coercion.
The status of workers found on the premises of a business is also controlled
through integrated inspection oversight. There were a total of 40,757 Labour
Inspectorate audits in 2011 (including integrated audits), which found a total of
171,264 people at places of work, among them 6,230 people without employment
contracts (that is, in shadow employment). After inspectors intervened, employers
entered into contracts with a total of 4,622 people (or 74.2 %). The sectors of
activity with the most frequent incidence of undeclared work were wholesale and
retail trade, catering, construction, and food production. Of the total number of
people found not to have employment contracts, 23 % were engaged in trade, 16 %
in catering, 15.5 % in construction, and 8.7 % in food production.
Table 8.1 provides an overview of the overall results of inspection oversight of
shadow employment in Serbia between 2007 and 2011.
As can be seen from Table 8.1, the Inspectorate carried out some 40,000 audits
per year; this figure followed a downward trend, with 2011 seeing one-third fewer
audits than 2007. At the same time, however, the total number of employees
covered by these audits nearly doubled, which means that the focus of oversight
shifted onto larger businesses with more employees: the average number of workers
at a business or with an entrepreneur increased from six to more than 15 over the
observed period. At the same time the number of people found to be working in the
shadow economy nearly halved (from 10,448 to 5,744), as did the number of those
employed following audits (from 7,517 to 4,314). Nonetheless, the efficiency of
oversight remained high or even increased, given that nearly three-quarters of all
workers found to be employed informally were admitted into formal employment
following an audit.
The fact that far more undeclared workers were found in the ‘boom years’ of
2007 and 2008, and that the number continually declined from 2009 to 2011 after
the crisis, is consistent with the findings of the successive Labour Force Surveys
from 2008 to the present. It is, however, part of a longer-term trend that can be
followed back in time to 2005. Starting in that year the number of workers without a
valid employment contract discovered by inspectors has constantly been on the
decline, while the degree of their subjective formalisation has remained relatively
stable.1
Therefore, judging by the data collected by the Labour Inspectorate since 2005,
we could conclude that tackling undeclared work at registered businesses has been
very successful, and that the number of cases of such work uncovered has been
reduced to one-quarter of the initial figure in just seven years. This would also
match to a large extent the declining rate of informal employment, especially
outside the agriculture sector, found by household surveys (admittedly from
1A total of 28,735 people were identified as illicit workers in 2005, while 21,563 of them went on
to gain formal contracts. In 2006 the number of undeclared workers was 16,205, of which 11,324
were subsequently employed formally.
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different sources: the Living Standards Measurement Study for 2002, 2003, and
2007, and the Labour Force Survey conducted using indirect methodology in 2005
and direct methodology since 2008). Estimates made by respondents in the Survey
on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia of the extent, types, features, and
desirability of shadow employment can neither definitely confirm nor deny data
found in Labour Inspectorate reports.
The number of instances of oversight (audits) reported by respondents generally
bears out the assumption that the focus of oversight was businesses and entrepre-
neurs employing five or more workers, with audits taking place at two-thirds of
such entities; conversely, one in every two entities with four or less workers was
audited (Table 8.2). When data are viewed by sector of activity, most audits were of
catering businesses (80 %), followed by industry and trade (64 and 62 %, respec-
tively); while far fewer audits were made of construction businesses where informal
employment is most common—only one in three construction firms from the
sample were audited by the Inspectorate in 2011. The greatest number of audits,
proportionally, took place in Central Serbia (65 %), followed by Belgrade (50 %),
while Vojvodina saw the fewest audits (39 %).
While companies taking part in the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in
Serbia believed that the extent of informal employment and undeclared wages was
relatively high, a fairly low score was awarded to the Labour Inspectorate’s efforts
at uncovering workers without contracts and other types of informal employment
(Fig. 8.2). A generally positive score was given by 42 % of respondents, while 51 %
viewed the Inspectorate’s work in a generally negative light.
8.4 Market Inspection
The Market Inspectorate is a separate division of the Ministry of Foreign and
Internal Trade and Telecommunications. The division is made up of two sections:
the Section for Co-Ordination Oversight of Trade in Goods and the Section for
Co-Ordination of Oversight of Services, Prevention of Unfair Competition, and
Oversight Support. The Market Inspectorate’s headquarters are at the Ministry and













2007 48,255 268,682 10,448 7,517
2008 42,595 306,416 9,054 6,394
2009 40,222 357,498 5,734 4,178
2010 37,747 558,536 5,228 3,925
2011 33,920 503,613 5,744 4,314
Source: Labour Inspectorate, Annual Report 2011
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it has 24 territorial units and 4 specialised branches in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nisˇ, and
Kragujevac.
The Market Inspectorate’s remit is very broad and is governed by a myriad of
laws and bylaws, which clearly impedes its efficiency and often leads to
Table 8.2 Labour and
Market Inspectorates audits
by features of business
entities






Up to 4 50.0 41.0
5–19 68.0 54.0
20 and more 64.0 44.0











Central Serbia 65.0 52.0
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Busi-
ness in Serbia, FREN 2012
Fig. 8.2 How successful is the Labour Inspectorate in uncovering workers without employment
contracts or in other types of informal employment? Source: Own calculations. Survey on
Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN 2012
118 M. Arandarenko
overlapping with other inspection services. However, it can be said that the primary
task of this service is to ensure the application of the Law on Trade and, as part of
that effort, prevent various types of informal trade. The principal legislative frame-
work for the operation of the Market Inspectorate is the 2010 Law on Trade, a piece
of legislation that provided a unified structure for issues hitherto regulated by three
separate laws—the old Law on Trade, the Law on Conditions for Trading in Goods
and Providing Services Related to Trade in Goods and on Inspection Oversight, and
the Law on Prices. However, the remit of the Market Inspectorate goes beyond the
scope of the Law on Trade and covers a total of 27 laws, including those governing
consumer protection, prevention of money laundering, wholesale and retail trade in
tobacco products, product safety, advertising, copyright protection, anti-smoking
measures, etc.
The Market Inspectorate engages in various forms of oversight that differ in
scope, methods, areas audited, and aims. Oversight may be pursued ex officio,
pursuant to an official order, or pursuant to a report of an infringement. Any
interested legal entity or individual may contact the Inspectorate; reports of
infringements may also be filed online.
In the course of an audit a market inspector is authorised to inspect the premises
of a business entity or the premises where its business is conducted; inspect ledgers,
records, official documents, and any and all other documents both in paper form and
stored by electronic means that relate to the trading engaged in; inspect personal
identity papers of persons engaging in trade; extract oral and written statements on
issues of importance for the audit; photograph or film premises where trading is
engaged in, or the goods or other items being audited; inspect vehicles used in the
course of trading; sample goods and other items; seek court warrants for searching
homes or ancillary buildings in the event of suspecting them to be used for illicit
trading; and seek assistance by the police or municipal police. In performing
oversight the Market Inspection Division adheres to principles of administrative
proceedings as governed by the Law on General Administrative Proceedings, which
include the right of parties to lodge complaints against rulings issued by market
inspectors.
In the event that the Market Inspectorate establishes that an infringement has
taken place, it cannot impose a fine directly, but can only file criminal charges,
charges for economic crime, or misdemeanour charges. It may also report the
offender to a professional tribunal (the Court of Honour). However, if a law has
been infringed, a market inspector is authorised to issue a ruling requiring the
infringement be remedied, temporarily ban trading in particular goods or provision
of particular services, temporarily close down a retail or wholesale outlet, or call for
goods to be confiscated.
Article 54 of the Law on Trade has conferred some powers previously held by
the Market Inspectorate onto the Municipal Inspectorate, particularly those relating
to trade outside of formal shops and ensuring adherence to working hours. It is
important to note that the Municipal Inspectorate has the same powers in exercising
these functions as the Market Inspectorate.
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The manifestations of the informal economy faced by market inspectors are
many and varied. Firstly, market participants such as illicit traders or entrepreneurs
and people who engage in illegal activity may be completely invisible to public
registries. Secondly, business entities may be registered with a public registry but
may pursue part of their activities in an illicit manner, without registration or the
required permits. In trade sector, legal traders may sell smuggled or illicit goods; in
catering, a legal cafe´ may quickly turn into an illegal nightclub, etc. A survey
carried out by the Serbian Association of Employers (Socio-Economic Council of
the Republic of Serbia 2010) showed that in the informal sector goods are most
often sold through personal advertisements, in markets, in undeclared stores or
craftsmen’s shops held by self-employed persons, from improvised roadside stalls,
at illegal distribution centres, through illegal door-to-door sales, through illicit sales
in otherwise legal outlets, and through illegal commission sales at legal entities’
premises.
In 2011 the Market Inspectorate employed 487 staff, nearly all of them with
university degrees. The majority of staff had backgrounds in economics (44 %) and
law (24 %). The standard of equipment is good, with all employees provided with
laptop computers, portable 3G modems for accessing the Inspectorate’s intranet,
and mobile telephones. On average, there is one official vehicle for every two
inspectors. The Inspectorate has developed software applications to improve the
records of inspection activities, provide information on unsafe products
(‘NEPRO’), record actions taken to protect copyright, and to record goods confis-
cated during audits.
The Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia found that the Market
Inspectorate had visited 43 % of all respondents (Table 8.2), of which one-third
were audited more than once a year. Audits did not take more than one day in 73 %
of cases and took more than 3 days in 9 % of cases. As expected, most audits were in
the catering and trade sectors (68 % of all catering establishments and 63 % of all
trading businesses and shops were audited). Above-average numbers of audit were
also seen in production (55 % of entities visited), while other sectors recorded
below-average levels of oversight. Greater incidence of oversight was seen by
entrepreneurs than by businesses (45 % vs. 38 %, respectively); similarly, busi-
nesses with between 5 and 19 workers were audited more than those with less than
five employees or those with more than 20 workers (54, 41, and 44 %, respectively).
Most audits were made in Central Serbia, with oversight in Vojvodina being at the
level of the national average, and Belgrade seeing a below-average incidence of
oversight.
Respondents mainly viewed the Market Inspectorate in a positive light: 52 %
gave it a score of 4 or 5 on a scale of one to five, while 13 % of respondents assessed
its performance negatively (1 or 2 on the same scale). These scores were slightly
lower than those awarded to the two other public services, the Labour Inspectorate
and the Tax Administration. This is borne out by the average scores: 3.5 for the
Market Inspectorate and 3.6 for both the Labour Inspectorate and the Tax
Administration.
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